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RECENT CASES
CONTRACTS- CEILING PRICE LEGISLATION EFFECT UPON PERFORMANCE
Prior to the delivery date of a contract for the sale of goods, ceiling
price legislation made the contract illegal and unenforceable at the
original contract price. The seller offered to perform at the new lower
price, but the buyer, contending that the supervening government act
had terminated the contract, refused. The seller instituted arbitration
proceedings pursuant to a provision in the contract. The trial court
sustained the buyer's motion to stay the proceedings. HeZd, reversed.
The price regulation did not void the contract but rather set a price
above which it could not be performed. Application of Josephs, 280
App. Div. 326, 113 N.Y.S.2d 540 (1st Dep't 1952).'
According to early common law, a contract was enforced according
to its literal terms; neither impossibility nor any change in circumstances, however extreme, would excuse performance. 2 However, because the application of this strict rule caused inequitable results, the
4
courts created certain exceptions. 3 Among the exceptions suspending
1. It is to be noted that this case is not one for breach of contract, but in-

volves only the issue of allowing the parties to proceed to arbitration. As to
the controlling law in a breach of contract suit in a case of this type, see Notes,
151 A.L.R. 1450 (1944), 147 A.L.R.1286 (1943).
2. Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647); Brason v. Dean,
3 Mod. 39, 87 Eng. Rep. 24 (K.B. 1684). Although Paradinev. Jane is the most
often cited case as authority for the strict rule, it has been criticized as not being a case of impossibility. For this excellent discussion, see Page, The Development of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REV.
589 (1920).
3. Impossibility due to the destruction of the subject-matter where the contract calls for a specific as distinguished from general subject-matter: Womack
v. McQuarry, 28 Ind. 103, 92 Am. Dec. 306 (1867); Matthews Const. Co. v.
Brady, 104 N.J.L. 438, 140 Atl. 433 (1928); Gouled v. Holwitz, 95 N.J.L. 277,
113 Atl. 323 (Sup. Ct. 1921); Greenberg v. Sun Shipbuilding Co., 277 Pa. 312,
121 Atl. 63 (1923); Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 Best & Sm. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q.B.
1863). Impossibility due to the death of one of the parties: Victory v. Union
County Trust Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 908, 134 Atl. 883 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Sargent v. McLeod, 209 N.Y. 360, 103 N.E. 164, 52 L.R.A. (N.s.) 380 (1913); Parker v. Macomber, 17 R.I. 674, 24 Atl. 464, 16 L.R.A. 858 (1892). Impossibility due to the death
of one of the parties to a joint contract: Griggs v. Swift, 82 Ga. 392, 9 S.E. 1062,
14 Am. St. Rep. 176 (1889). Contra: Hughes v. Gross, 166 Mass. 61, 43 N.E.
1031 (1896); Martin v. Hunt, 83 Mass. 418 (1861). Impossibility caused by a
subsequent change of domestic law: Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley,
219 U.S. 467, 31 Sup. Ct. 265, 55 L. Ed. 297 (1911), reversing 133 Ky. 652, 118
S.W. 982 (1909); Buffalo East Side R.R. v. Buffalo Street R.R., 111 N.Y. 132, 19
N.E. 63, 2 L.R.A. 384 (1888); Heart v. East Tennessee Brewing Co., 121 Tenn.
69, 113 S.W. 364, 130 Am. St. Rep. 753 (1908). It is generally held that impossibility due to a change in foreign law is no excuse for breach of contract. Gray
& Co. v. Cavalliotis, 276 Fed. 565 (E.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd mem., 293 Fed. 1018
(2d Cir. 1923); Beebe v. Johnson, 19 Wend. 500, 32 Am. Dec. 518 (N.Y. 1838).
4. Patch v. Solar Corp., 149 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 741
(1945). But cf. Edward Maurer Co. v. Tubeless Tire Co., 272 Fed. 990 (N.D.
Ohio 1921), aff'd, 285 Fed. 713 (6th Cir. 1922).
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or discharging 5 the contract was supervening illegality due to a change
7
6
in domestic law brought about by subsequent legislation or judicial
8
or administrative order. Price regulation, as such legislation, thus excused 9 performance.
The Kramer case, 10 in which the facts were substantially the same as
those in the instant case except that the buyer rather than the seller
sought arbitration, has been regarded as controlling the effect of supervening price regulation on a contract. There the court, sustaining the
seller's motion to stay the arbitration proceedings, reasoned that the
supervening price regulation had terminated the contract and that
nothing remained to arbitrate. The holding in the Kramer case can be
criticized in that it weakens the stability of contracts in this era of
changing price regulations; furthermore, it destroys the whole purpose
of an arbitration clause which is designed to avoid litigation over controversies arising under the contract."
The court in the instant case distinguished the Kramer case on the
theory that that holding did not mean that the contract was terminated
but merely that it could not be enforced at the above-ceiling contract
price. The court also emphasized the fact that the buyer should not be
allowed to avoid the contract since he "is being accorded even more
favorable treatment than he bargained for."' 2 This distinction 13 is fallacious since the buyer will not be benefited if the seller has the option
of performance in a buyers' market or of refusal to perform in a sellers'
market.
The cases are inconsistent in that the seller is allowed to arbitrate
while the buyer is denied that privilege. If this case overrules the
Kramer case, parties can now enter into a contract knowing that a
change in price regulation will not void the contract but will allow
them to abide by their contract and proceed with arbitration. The effect the courts will give to the instant decision, in relation to the
Kramer case, only future cases will reveal.
5. Sanders v. Lowenstein & Sons, 264 App. Div. 367, 35 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1st

Dep't), aff'd mem., 289 N.Y. 702, 45 N.E.2d 457 (1942).
6. Jarrett v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 131 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1942); Standard Chemicals &Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chemical Corp.; 194 App. Div. 254, 185
N.Y. Supp. 207 (1st Dep't 1920).

7. See Moller v. Herring, 255 Fed. 670 (5th Cir. 1919); Operators' Oil Co. v.
Barbre, 65 F.2d 857, 862 (10th Cir. 1933).
8. Mawhinney v. Millbrook Woolen Mills, Inc., 231 N.Y. 290, 132 N.E. 93
(1921).
9. Standard Chemicals & Metals Corp. v. Waugh Chemical Corp., 194 App.
Div. 254, 185 N.Y. Supp. 207 (1st Dep't 1920) ; see note 5 supra.
10. In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493, 141 A.L.R. 1497

(1942).

11. See In re Kramer & Uchitelle, Inc., 43 N.E.2d 493, 497 (1942)

(dissenting

opinion).
12. Instant case, 113 N.Y.S.2d at 541.
13. See Philadelphia Coke Co. v. Bowles, 139 F.2d 349, 357 (Emerg. Ct. App.
Phila. 1943), which considered this distinction.
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THIRD-PARTY CONFESSIONS
Defendant was convicted of murder in a trial where his own confession, which was in some respects inconsistent with established facts
concerning the murder, was admitted against him though he repudiated it as coerced. Evidence of a confession by a third party was excluded. Held, reversed and a new trial ordered. Repudiation of the
confession which was inconsistent with established facts constituted
sufficient circumstances to justify admission of the third-party confession. People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952).
An extra-judicial statement of one not a party to a criminal prosecution that he, rather than the accused, committed the crime is pure
hearsay.' The single exception by which such a statement could theoretically be admitted as evidence, if not part of the so-called res
gestae,2 is as a declaration against interest. Such a statement would be
against the penal interest of the declarant since the matter asserted
could subject him to criminal prosecution. However, the courts, with
a few exceptions,3 have refused to class a declaration against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule.4 Thus by the great weight of
authority a confession of a third person, now unavailable as a witness,
is not admissible in aid of the accused.5 The few cases which have ad1. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 276, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 57 L. Ed.
820 (1913); Brown v. State, 99 Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911). See also 5 WIGMoRE,
EVIDENCE § 1476 (3d ed. 1940); 20 Am. Jur., Evidence § 495 (1939).
2. If the statement is part of the so-called res gestae it is, of course. admissible. See Perdue v. State, 126 Ga. 112, 54 S.E. 820 (1906); see State v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 2209, 80 S.W. 221, 222 (1904); State v. Toten, 72 Vt.
73, 47 AtI. 105, 106 (1899) ; Greenfield v. People, 85 N.Y. 75, 87, 39 Am. St. Rep.
636 (1881). See also 20 Am. JUR., Evidence § 495 (1939).
3. Some courts have admitted declarations against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule. Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284,
162 A.L.R. 437 (1945); Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148, 48 A.L.R.

342 (1926); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 35 A.L.R. 431

(1923); see Ballew v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. R. 636, 141 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1940);
Morris v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. R. 277, 98 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1936); Proctor v.
State, 114 Tex. Crim. R. 383, 25 S.W.2d 350, 352 (1930). But see, MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE, Rule 509 (1) (1942).
4. Prior to the Sussex Peerage Case, 11 C1. & Fin. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L.
1844), the English courts had accepted such declarations as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Standen v. Standen, 1 Peake (N.P.) 45, 170 Eng. Rep. 73 (1791).
See cases cited note 5 infra,which refuse to class penal interests in the declaration against interest exception. For a thorough treatment of this subject, see
also Note, 162 A.L.R. 446 (1946).
5. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 57 L. Ed. 820
(1913); West v. State, 76 Ala. 98 (1884); Snow v. State, 54 Ala. 138 (1875);
Snow v. State, 58 Ala. 372 (1877); Bryant v. State, 197 Ga. 641, 30 S.E.2d 259
(1944); Commonwealth v. Wakelin, 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918); State
v. Hack, 118 Mo. 92, 23 S.W. 1089 (1893); State v. Evans, 55 Mo. 460 (1874);
State v. Duncan, 28 N.C. 236 (1846); Cox v. State, 160 Tenn. 221, 22 S.W.2d 225
(1929); Peck v. State, 86 Tenn. 259, 6 S.W. 389 (1888); Rhea v. State, 18 Tenn.
257 (1837); State v. Totten, 72 Vt. 73, 47 AtI. 105 (1899).
In several cases where third-party confessions were excluded the court spoke
of the majority rule, yet the declarant was available as a witness and such
statements would not be admissible under either rule. See Brown v. State, 99
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mitted these statements reject the rule that a declaration against in6
terest does not include penal interests.
The majority view has been criticized by Wigmore as "barbarous"
and "shocking to the sense of justice' 7 because the view cannot be justified on the ground of public policy and because such evidence is as
reliable as other admissible hearsay. The dissenting opinion of Justice
Holmes in Donnelly v. United States8 pointed out the unreasonableness
of the rule and advocated its rejection. Holmes' reasoning was later
applied in Hines v. "Commonwealth9 which, though recognizing the
overwhelming weight of authority to the contrary, admitted the declaration where the conviction rested solely on circumstantial evidence. 10
The present view of the minority rule, which admits third-party confessions, seems to limit its application to cases where the conviction is
based solely on circumstantial evidence or where there are special circumstances in the case meriting an exception to the general rule.
In the instant case the court recognized the sound reasoning of the
rule excluding such evidence" but refused to apply it because of the
special circumstances involved. However, the determination of "spe12
cial circumstances" depends upon the facts of each case.
The recognized danger of allowing third-party confessions to be admitted as evidence of defendant's innocence seems to be no more
ominous than the injustice resulting from the refusal to allow the defendant to use every reasonable means to exonerate himself. There is
Miss. 719, 55 So. 961 (1911); State v. May, 15 N.C. 328 (1833). For a complete
listing of the pros and cons of this rule, see Notes, 35 A.L.R. 441 (1925), 48
A.L.R. 348 (1927), 162 A.L.R. 446 (1946), 167 A.L.R. 394 (1947), 131 Am.St.
Rep. 778 (1910). See 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1476 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148, 48 A.L.R. 342 (1926) (special
circumstances rule applied); Newberry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61
S.E.2d 318 (1950); Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 35 A.L.R.
431 (1923); df. Zimmerman v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 578, 189 S.E. 144 (1937).
The rule is settled in Texas that confessions or statements of a third person
now unavailable as a witness that he and not the defendant committed the
crime is admissible whenever the state is relying solely on circumstantial evidence. See Ballew v. State, 139 Tex. Crim. R. 636, 141 S.W.2d 654, 655 (1940);
Morris v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. R. 277, 98 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1936); Stinson v.
State, 124 Tex. Crim. R. 52, 60 S.W.2d 773, 774 (1933); Proctor v. State, 114 Tex.
Crim. R. 383, 25 S.W.2d 350, 352 (1930); Wise v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. R. 58, 273
S.W. 850 (1925); see Morgan, DeclarationsAgainst Interest in Texas, 10 TEXAS
L. REV. 399 (1932). In Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43, 167 A.L.R. 390
(1946), the court admitted the extra-judicial confession of a person who was
present at the trial as a witness on the ground that the evidence derived its
sole value from the declarant who could be cross-examined.
7. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1477 (3d ed. 1940).

8. 228 U.S. 243, 277, 33 Sup. Ct. 449, 57 L. Ed. 820 (1913).
9. 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 35 A.L.R. 431 (1923).
10. See Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843, 848, 35 A.L.R. 431,

439 (1923). In view of the great weight of authority against its position, the
court limited the effect of this decision to the case before it.
11. 108 N.E.2d at 491, 492.
12. See e.g., Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 Atl. 148, 48 A.L.R. 342 (1926)
(bastardy proceeding where admission of fatherhood was in suicide letter written the same day child was born).
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apparently some trend toward admitting such confessions; but, as long
-as courts persist in their refusal to accept a declaration against penal
interest as an exception to the hearsay rule, progress in this direction
will doubtless be slow.
FAMILY LAW -LOSS

OF CONSORTIUM OF THE PARENT -

RIGHT OF CHILD TO RECOVER AGAINST A NEGLIGENT DEFENDANT
Plaintiff, a child whose mother was injured by defendant's negligence, sued to recover damages resulting from deprivation of the comfort, aid, kindness and assistance of her mother. Defendant moved to
-dismiss the complaint. Held, for defendant. The right of recovery for
loss of a parent's affection caused by defendant's negligence is not extended to a child. Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, 108 F. Supp. 739
(D.D.C. 1952).
'The law relating to consortium has developed in four definite progressive stages. (1) Originally, only the husband could sue for loss of
,consortium.' His cause of action grew out of services which, under the
marriage contract, were due him from his wife. For interference with
those services a cause of action would lie analagous to that which a
master had for interference with the services of a servant.2 During this
stage of the development of the law, the wife or child, inferior parties
to the relationship to whom no services were owed, had no cause of
action for loss of consortium.3 (2) After the emancipation statutes
most courts allowed the wife to recover, where the loss of consortium
was occasioned by the wilful or malicious acts of the defendant in an
action for alienation of affections. However, recovery was refused in
negligence cases 4 upon the distinction that in the former situation there
1. Morgan v. Martin, 92 Me. 190, 42 AtI. 354 (1898); Doe v. Roe, 82 Me. 503,
20 Atl. 83 (1890); Duffies v. Duffies, 76 Wis. 374, 45 N.W. 522 (1890) (cases of
alienation of affections involving loss of consortium). See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMILY LAWS § 158 (1935); Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. R.EV. 1 (1923). For the first case on consortium see Winsmore

v. Greenbank, Willes 577, 125 Eng. Rep. 1330 (C.P. 1745).
2. See 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 158 (1935); Lippman, The
Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REV. 651, 653 (1930). For a contention
that this is not the correct historical theory see Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry.,
78 N.H. 289, 99 Atl. 298, 300 (1916).
3. See Stout v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S.W. 1019,
1020 (1913); cf. Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct.
1900). See 3 BL. COMM. *143; 3 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws § 158 (1935).
That the crux of the action is based upon services, see Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, Inc., 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933).
4. "The enlarged right of the wife under the Married Women's Acts is
therefore pretty clear; she can generally sue for any intentional injury to the
consortium, but cannot sue for a loss of consortium due to negligence." Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 6 (1923).
See Clow v. Chapman, 125 Mo. 101, 28 S.W. 328 (1894); Goldman V. Cohen, 30
Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900). See Lippman, The Breakdown of
Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651, 654 (1930).
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was a direct wrong to the wife which gave rise to a right which ha'd
always been present but unassertable before the emancipation -statutes.5 (3) Though the general rule seems to be that a child cannot recover for loss of consortium, either because he had no legally enforceable right to the services of the parent 6 or because consortium was.
thought of as growing out of a marriage contract,7 recently a few
courts have allowed a child to recover for alienation of the affections
of a parent if a third party intentionally depriveg the child of those elements of consortium which are his by virtue of the family relationship,
upon the theory that a child has a right in the family relationship
which is enforceable at law. 8 (4) Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. 9 allowed a
wife a cause of action for loss of consortium of the husband occasioned
by the negligence of the defendant.
The Hitaffer case criticized, as one of the basic fallacies in the reasoning of the consortium cases, the idea that service is considered the predominant element of consortium. 10 It was there stated that "Consortium, although it embraces within its ambit of meaning the wife's material services, also includes love, affection, companionship .... etc., all
welded into a conceptualistic unity,"" and that the loss of any of these
should be compensable. Another fallacy in the consortium cases is the
idea that the child, though morally entitled to these elements of consortium from the parent, cannot legally enforce these rights 12 . and,
hence, should not recover from a third party for loss of them. 13 Miller
5. Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891); Bennett v. Bennett,
116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17 (1889); see Cravens v. Louisville & N.R.R., 195 Ky. 257,
242 S.W. 628, 632 (1922).

6. Huke v. Huke, 44 Mo. App. 308 (1891); Henson v. Thomas, 231 N.C. 173,
56 S.E.2d 432 (1949). See PROSSER, TORTS 936 (1941); Pound, Individual In-

terests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MicH. L. REV. 177, 185 (1916).
7. See Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 214 Pac. 400 (1923); Hamilton v.
McNeil, 150 Iowa 470, 129 N.W. 480 (1911); Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc.
134, 273 N.Y. Supp. 912 (Sup. Ct. 1934); cf. McMillan v. Taylor, 160 F.2d 221
(D.C. Cir. 1946); Rudley v. Tobias, 84 Cal.App.2d 454, 190 P.2d 984 (1948).
8. Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Russick v. Hicks, 85 F. Supp.
281 (W.D. Mich. 1949); Johnson v. Luhman, 330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N.E.2d 810
(1947); see Heck v. Schupp, 394 Il. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1946).
9. 87 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950),
4 VAND. L. REv. 358 (1951). This case was followed in Passalacqua v. Draper,
199 Misc. 827, 104 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd, 279 App. Div. 660, 107 N.Y.S.2d
812 (2d Dep't 1951). Hipp v. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318
(1921), allowed recovery of this nature, but apparently was overruled by Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
10. Accord, Guevin v. Manchester Ry., 78 N.H. 289, 99 Atl. 298 (1916); PRosSER, TORTS 948 (1941) ; Note, 162 A.L.R. 824, 826 (1946). That damages in a loss
of consortium case are punitive rather than compensatory, see Goldman v.
Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (Sup. Ct. 1900), and Lippman, The
Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REV. 651 (1930).

11. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.),,

cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), 4 VAND. L. REV. 358 (1951).
12. See MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 112 (1931). That a
child's right to support cannot be enforced by the child, see Rawlings v. Rawlings, 121 Miss. 140, 83 So. 146 (1919); Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d_
763 (1935). See Alling v. Ailing, 52 N.J. Eq. 92, 27 Atl. 655, 659 (1893).
13. 2 COOLEY, TORTS § 174 (4th ed. 1932).
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v. Monsen 14 pointed out that the family relationship can be divided into

two groups, the relationship of the members of the family one to another, which is largely self-governed by moral law, and the relationship of a member of the family with a third party who is outside the
family unit.
The rights of the child to certain elements of consortium have been
recognized; 5 and the right of the wife to recover has been allowed although the loss of conisortium was through the negligence of the defendant. 16 It seems that the next step should be a combination of these
lines of reasoning to allow the child to recover where the child has been
7
deprived of elements of consortium by the negligence of a third party.'
In the development of this area of the law, the instant case presents
a step which has not yet been taken.' 8 Although the court indicates a
belief that such should be the law, it apparently feels that precedent
is too well established to allow a lower court to expand the law of
consortium and suggests that a higher court take the step.' 9

FEDERAL PROCEDURE- STATUTORY CONSTRUCTIONMEANING OF "MENTALLY INCOMPETENT"
After indictment for a federal offense, petitioner, pursuant to a
federal statute, was adjudged mentally incompetent and was committed to the custody of the Attorney General to be confined until he
became competent to stand trial or until the charges against him were
disposed of according to law. Petitioner, claiming to be permanently
insane, brought this habeas corpus proceeding in which he challenged
the power of the United States to confine him for an indefinite time in
advance of trial on the criminal charge, merely because he was insane.
14. 228 Minn. 400, 37 N.W.2d 543, 544 (1949).
15. "As against the world at large a child has an interest in the relation be-

cause of the support he may expect by virtue thereof while infancy or, after

majority, circumstances precluding self-support render it improper or impossible for him to be left to himself. Also he has an interest in the society and affections of the parent, at least while he remains in the household. But the law
has done little to secure these interests." Pound, Individual Interests in the
Domestic Relations, 14 MicH. L. REv. 177, 185 (1916). See 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN
FAMmY LAWS § 266 (1936); Note 74 A.L.R. 11, 29 (1931). Also see cases cited
note 9 supra.
16. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 87 App. D.C. 57, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950), 4 VAND. L. REV. 358 (1951).
17. "Ultimately it may be expected that public opinion as to the equality of
the sexes will force recognition of the wife's action. Perhaps at that time some
thought will be given to the relational interest of the child, which thus far has
been denied all remedy for any loss suffered through injury to its parent."
PROSSER, TORTS 948 (1941).
18. Expressly refused in Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W.
154 (1935); cf. Welch v. Davis, 410 Ill. 130, 101 N.E.2d 547 (1951) (administrator
of the mother recovered for the benefit of the daughter from the estate of the

father for the wrongful death of the mother).
19. Instant case, 108 F. Supp. at 741.
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His petition was denied. Held, judgment vacated and cause remanded for determination of temporary or permanent insanity. The
statute, construed to avoid constitutional questions, only permits commitment of one temporarily mentally incompetent. Wells, by Gillig, v.
Attorney General of the United States, 201 F.2d 556 (10th Cir. 1953).
Mental incompetency is relevant in criminal law administration:
(1) at the time of the act, where the question is whether the accused
is sane enough to be held legally responsible for the act under the
."right-wrong"1 test or, in some states, under the irresistible impulse
test; 2 (2) at the time of the criminal proceedings, where the test is
whether the accused has the capacity to understand the nature and
object of the proceeding against him, to communicate with his attorney
in a rational manner and to aid effectively in the preparation of his
defense; 3 (3) at the time of punishment, where the test is whether the
convicted has the capacity to understand the nature, purpose and effect
of the punishment to be executed upon him.4 The federal courts by
statute 5 recognize the doctrine codified 6 by most states that when a person is found insane after arrest and before trial, he may not be tried,
convicted or punished.7 The prosecution must be suspended, and the
1. See generally 14 Am. Jur., CriminalLaw §§ 32, 40 (1938);
TAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 214-31 (1927);

GLUECK,

MEN-

WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A

DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 17-44 (1933).
2. See 14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law § 35 (1938); GLuECK, MENTAL DISORDER
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 232-45 (1927); WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN
CRIMINAL LAW 44:64 (1933).
3. "The precise question . . . is to determine whether at this time the
prisoner is in such possession of his mental faculties as enables him to rightly
comprehend his condition with reference to the proceedings against him, and
to rationally aid in the conduct of his defense." United States v. Chisolm, 149
Fed. 284, 287 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906). See Jordan v. State, 124 Tenn. 81, 135 S.W.
327, 329, 34 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1115 (1910). See also Notes, 3 A.L.R. 94 (1919); 142
A.L.R. 961 (1943); 14 AM. JuR., Criminal Law §§ 44, 45 (1938); Note, 11
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 438 (1934); GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
47-95 (1927); WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 341-77
(1933). A breakdown of the heading "insanity at the time of the criminal proceedings" would include: Insanity before indictment, insanity after indictment and before trial, and insanity during trial.
4. See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 14, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 94 L. Ed. 604
(1950) (dissenting opinion); see Note, 49 A.L.R. 804 (1927); 14 AM. JuR.,
CriminalLaw § 49 (1938); Dession, The Mentally III Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration,53 YALE L.J. 684, 696 (1944); WEIHOFEN, INSANITY
AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 385-95 (1933). Generally, if the punishment to
be executed is less than death, a defendant may not after sentence interpose for
the first time, a plea of present insanity as a bar to th punishment. Kelley v.
State, 157 Ark. 48, 247 S.W. 381 (1923). The reason behind this rule is that
provision is usually made for the hospitalization in proper institutions of convicts found to be insane while serving sentence. 39 STAT. 309 (1916), 24
U.S.C.A. § 212 (1927); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 123, § 103 (1950); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 4476 (Williams 1934).
5. 63 STAT. 686 (1949), 18 U.S.C.A. § 4244 (1951).
6. MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 123, § 100 (1950); N.Y. CRIM. CODE §§ 658, 662-b;
TENN. CODE ANN. §§

4519, 4476 (Williams 1932);

GLUEcK, MENTAL DISoRDER' AND

THE CRIMINAL LAW 504-643 (1927); KOREN, SUMMARIES OF STATE LAWS RELATING TO THE INSANE (Hamilton and Haber ed., 1918).
7. ,See Youtsey v. United States, 97 Fed. 937, 940-42 (6th Cir. 1899). "Also,
if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraign-
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accused confined until his sanity is restored.8
In the' instant case the issue was whether one who claimed to be
permanently insane could constitutionally be subjected to section 4246
of Title 18 providing that: "Whenever the trial court shall determine
in accordance with sections 4244... of this title that an accused is or
was mentally incompetent, the court may commit the accused to the
custody of the Attorney General or his authorized representative, until the accused shall be mentally competent to stand trial or until the
pending charges against him are disposed of according to law."9 ThQ
majority opinion construes the statute as applicable only when the accused is temporarily insane, reasoning that if the statute authorized
detention of the permanently insane, a question of constitutionality
would be forced on the court. The dissenting opinion reasons that the
Federal Government may constitutionally make provision for the care
of incompetent persons irrespective of the duration of the mental incapacity where those persons are properly brought within its control
by the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction.
Does one permanently insane come within the meaning of the term
"mentally incompetent" used in the statute? By a frequently stated
rule of statutory construction, when the words are plain and unambiguous their literal and ordinary meaning is to be adopted.10 Thus, it
ment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it because he is
not able to plead to it with that advice and caution that )he ought. And if,
after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how
can he make his defense? If, after he be tried and found guilty, he loses his
senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if after judgment he becomes of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of
sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment of execution." 4 BL. COMM. *24, 396. But cf. State ex. rel. Novak v. Utecht, 203 Minn.
448, 281 N.W. 775 (1938) (though court directed by statute not to try person
while insane, it does not go to the court's jurisdiction and failure to comply
with statute will not subject conviction to attack by habeas corpus or other
proceedings.
8. See Forthoffer v. Swope, 103 F.2d 707, 709 (9th Cir. 1939). When sanity
is restored the offender is to be returned for trial. See Miller v. Spring Grove
State Hospital, 80 A.2d 898, 900 (Md.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 841 (1951). One
who becomes insane after indictment will be committed to jail until sanity is
restored in -absence of statute authorizing committment to hospital. See Hawie
v. Hawie, 128 Miss. 473, 91 So. 131, 133 (1922).
9. 63 STAT. 686 (1949), 18 U.S.C.A. § 4246 (1951); 2 U.S. CODE CONGRESSIONAL
SEvc. 1928-29 (1949). Legislative history: '11 STAT. 158 (1857) and 18 STAT.
251 (1874), preceded 39 STAT. 309 (1916), 24 U.S.C.A. § 211 (1927). The 1874
statute seemed to authorize the committment to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital all
persons charged with offenses against the United States and found insane.
However, an opinion of the attorney general held that the foregoing statutes
applied only to insane defendants in the District of Columbia; thus the statute
did not apply to cases tried in any district court of the United States except the
District Court of the District of Columbia. 17 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 211 (1881). A
later statute permitted committment of any person in actual custody of federal
officers who had either been charged with a federal offense or convicted in a
court of the United States. 39 STAT. 309 (1916), 24 U.S.C.A. § 212 (1927). See
Holtzoff, Looking at the Law, 7 FED. PROBATION No. 2, 41 (1943); Pollak,

Insanity as a Bar to Prosecutionin the Federal Courts, 7 FED. B.J. 55, 69 (1945).

10. See Terral v. Terral, 212 Ark. 221, 205 S.W.2d 198, 201, 1 A.L.R.2d 1092

1953 ]

RECENT CASES

seems reasonable that where Congress used the broad term "mentally
incompetent," the plain and ordinary meaning does not import a
"temporary-permanent" limitation. Furthermore, this construction is
consistent with both the language and the over-all purpose" of the
statute. Had Congress intended the statute to apply only to the temporarily insane, would it not have made provisions for the disposition
12
of one permanently incompetent?
Under this literal construction 13 of the statute the significant constitutional questions raised and the policy reasons involved in favor of
such a construction should be considered. The general care and custody
(1947); Citizens' Tel. Co. v. City of Newport, 188 Ky. 629, 224 S.W. 187, 190,
14 A.L.R. 1369 (1920); Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 79 A.2d 525, 529 (Md.
1951); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 55 N.M. 51, 226 P.2d 464, 473 (1950). "Courts
should be slow to impart any other than their commonly understood meaning
to terms employed in the enactment of a statute .... It is a general rule of
statutory construction that words of a statute will be interpreted in their ordinary acceptation and significance and the meaning commonly attributed to
them." 50 Am. Jun., Statutes § 238 (1944). See also Jones, The Plain Meaning
Rule and Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 2 (1939).
11. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543,
60 Sup. Ct. 1059, 84 L. Ed. 1345 (1940); Albright v. United States, 76 F. Supp.
532, 537 (D. Minn. 1948); California Drive-In Restaurant Ass'n v. Clark, 22
Cal.2d 287, 140 P.2d 657, 660 (1943); Canfield Co. v. United Const. Workers,
134 Conn. 358, 57 A.2d 624, 625 (1948); see 59 Am. JuR., Statutes § 303 (1944);
Note, 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 892 (1930).

12. In the Southern District of New York the inadequateness of the federal
statutes on the detention of the presently insane resulted in this practice under
the former statutes. "There, when a defendant in a criminal case is found to
be presently insane, pending charges against him are withdrawn by the
Government and he is released from custody. The matter is informally brought
to the attention of State authorities who are relied upon to take the necessary
steps to have the defendant confined as an insane person. If the defendant's
sanity is subsequently restored he is not returned to the custody of the United
States District Court so that his prosecution may continue. Charges against
him are no longer pending in that court. Should the United States Attorney
be advised or learn that the defendant's sanity is so restored, he may, in some
cases, start prosecution anew, provided the statute of limitations has not run."
Pollak, Insanity as a Bar to Prosecutionin the Federal Courts, 7 FED. B.J. 55,
70 (1945). In cases where residence cannot be ascertained it is difficult to arrange for state committment of federal prisoners found presently insane since
most states require actual residence as a condition for entry to the state hospital. Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration,53 YALE L.J. 684, 694 (1944).
13. The many statutes providing for the care of insane lawfully within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Government are applied without regard
to the duration of mental incompetency. Saint Elizabeth's Hospital in the District of Columbia was established for the "humane care and enlightened curative treatment of the insane of the Army and Navy of the United States and
of the District of Columbia." 39 STAT. 309 (1916), 24 U.S.C.A. § 161 (1927).
Provision is made for the admission to this hospital of insane persons over
which the Federal Government exercises jurisdiction. 38 STAT. 801 (1915), 24
U.S.C.A. § 191 (1927) (personnel of the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast
Guard and civilians who become insane while employed in the Quartermaster
Corps of the Army); 62 STAT. 1018 (1948), 42 U.S.C.A. § 222 (1952) (insane
patients of the Public Health Service); 39 STAT. 309 (1916), 24 U.S.C.A. § 195
(1927) (insane inmates of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers);
39 STAT. 309 (1916), 24 U.S.C.A. § 211a (1927) (insane convicts); 55 STAT. 756
(1941), 24 U.S.C.A. § 191a (1952) (Foreign Service personnel adjudged insane
in 'foreign country).
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of the insane is a function of the state in its role as parens patriae.14
However, an existing power of the Federal Government is not limited
by this power of the state; hence, Congress may validly legislate concerning custody and detention of the mentally incompetent for the
purposes of criminal administration. Virtually all federal criminal law
machinery finds its constitutional basis in implied powers; thus "the
federal government is employing committment as an instrument for
the protection of federal interests or as a necessary adjunct to the exercise of federal powers."' 5 There is little case law on the constitutionality of the statute. Dixon v. Steele, 16 relied on by the majority, holds
that insofar as section 4246 gives the court a right to commit an accused
person for an indefinite time, it is beyond the constitutional power of
Congress because it allows one charged with a federal offense to be
"imprisoned for the rest of his life without any trial as to the issue of
whether or not he committed an offense, but only as to the question of
whether or not he was sane or insane at the time of the hearing.1'u
If the accused was insane at the time of the offense, then he is legally
guilty of no offense; yet this issue cannot be determined since he is
detained for insanity. However, the jurisdiction of the Federal Government over one accused and found presently insane should be, and
seemingly is, predicated on the charge of a federal offense and his
arrest therefor rather than on the issue of guilt for the crime. 18 The
accused thus properly within the control of the Federal Government
should then be subject to detention until, if ever, he is able to stand
trial.
A construction of the statute without the temporary-permanent limitation likewise seems justified on the policy considerations underlying
the statute. For under the circumstances there is no more reason why
a state rather than the Federal Government should detain an accused
found presently insane. If sane at the time of the act he has committted
14. See Yeomans v. Williams, 117 Ga. 800, 45 S.E. 73 (1903); Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406, 408, 412 (1908).
15. Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration,53 YALE L.J. 684, 692 (1944). "The right of a sovereign to proceed
against an insane person charged with the commission of a felony is incidental
to the power to define crimes and prescribe procedure under a criminal code.
[citations omitted]. So far as that power is resident in the Federal Government it can be traced to Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 18 of the Constitution of the United
States, relating to 'incidental powers."' Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670,
674 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
16. 104 F. Supp. 904 (W.D. Mo. 1951).

17. Id. at 908.
18. "Suffice it to say that an insane person who is charged with a federal
offense and has been arrested therefor, is for purposes of trial and judgment
thereon within the lawful custody and control of the Federal Government. If
requisites of due process are thereafter satisfied, the Federal Government has
the right and power to determine the issue of the mental capacity of such an
accused, not only to stand trial, but also the question of his competency to
commit the offense,. . ." Higgins v. McGrath, 98 F. Supp. 670, 674 (W.D. Mo.
1951).
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a federal crime and the Federal Government thus has an interest in
controlling his detention. Furthermore, is there not an implied duty
on any sovereign government to restrain the liberty of individuals
properly within its control if necessary to protect the community and
promote the health and welfare of those restrained? 19 Finally, when
one confined under the statute can show sufficient mental competency
to stand trial, the use of habeas corpus is an adequate safeguard of his
20
rights.

INCOME TAXATION -SURRENDER
OF LEASE
CAPITAL GAIN TO LESSEE

-

Petitioner, lessee, surrendered his year to year leasehold three
months prior to termination in consideration of a payment of $7,500 by
the lessor's assignee. The transaction was not reported on petitioner's
income tax return. The Commissioner determined that the $7,500 was
taxable to the lessee as ordinary income, but the Tax Court held that it
constituted a capital gain.' On petition for review to the Court of Appeals, held, affirmed. The compensated surrender of a lease by a tenant
is a sale of property resulting in capital gain rather than ordinary income. Commissioner of InternalRevenue v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d
Cir. 1952).
"Capital assets," within section 117 (a) ,2 means all property, tangible
and intangible,3 held by the taxpayer; there are several arbitrary exclusions, among which are stock in trade, property held primarily, for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of business and inventorial
property.4 Real estate and depreciable personal property used in a
trade or business and held for more than six months may be treated as
19. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 187 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541, 543 (1920); Dession,

The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration, 53
YALE L.J. 684, 693 (1944). Such restraint of the mentally incompetent is not
regarded as punishment. See In re Bryant, 214 La. 573, 38 So.2d 245, 249 (1949)';

In re Moulton, 77 N.H. 370, 77 A.2d 26, 28 (1950).
20. In re Buchanan, 129 Cal. 330, 61 Pac. 1120, 50 L.R.A. 378 (1900); Northfoss
v. Welch, 116 Minn. 62, 133 N.W. 82 (1911); see Overholser v. Boddie, 184 F.2d
240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1950). See also 25 AM. JuR., Habeas Corpus § 85 (1940);
GLUECK, MENTAL DIsORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 399-412 (1927); Pollak, Insanity as a Bar to Prosecution in the Federal Courts, 7 FED. B.J. 55, 68 (1945).

As to the remedy of one convicted of crime while insane, see Notes, 10 A.L.R.
213 (1921); 121 A.L.R. 267 (1939).
1. 16 T.C. 1450 (1951).

2. INT. REV. CODE § 117 (a).

3. See Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950) (exclusive general
insurance agency held a capital asset); Ranier Brewing Co. v. Comm'r, 7 T.C.
162 (1946), affd, 165 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948) (trade name held a capital asset).

See also Citizens State Bank v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1940).
4. See also INT. REV. CODE § 22 (a).
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capital assets under section 117 (j) ,5 to the extent that their transfer results in a net gain. 6 Not all property rights constitute capital assets
within these definitions; if the right is essentially an income item, the
proceeds from its transfer will not be considered as capital gain.? In the
sale of a contract right, for example, capital asset treatment would depend upon the nature of the income resulting from the fulfillment of
the contract. If the contract requires the rendition of personal services,
the proceeds of its sale ar ordinary income. 8
Hort v. Commissioner9 held that the sum paid to the landlord by the
tenant for release from a long term lease was taxable as ordinary income, and not as capital gain.' 0 The relinquishment of the right to future rental payments in return for a present, substituted payment and
possession of the leased premises was "essentially a substitute for
rental payments which § 22 (a) expressly characterizes as gross income."" The statement illustrates an inquiry beyond the form into the
substance of the transaction. The Court assumed that "the lease was
'property,' whatever that signifies abstractly,"'12 but determined that
the payment, as a substitute for ordinary income, was itself ordinary
13
income.
The Hort case is in agreement with the Commissioner's apparent po5. INT. REV. CODE § 117(j). See 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
§§ 22.01 et seq. (1942). See also 512 West Fifty-Sixth St. Corp. v. Comm'r, 151
F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1945) (lease as depreciable property).
6. To be entitled to capital gains treatment, the asset must fall within the
definitions of either § 117(a) or § 117(j) and, in addition, there must be a
"sale or exchange." See, e.g., 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 22.12
(1942). A "sale" of a capital asset, resulting in capital gain or loss, is a transfer of property for a valuable consideration. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450
(10th Cir. 1950) (cancellation of exclusive general insurance agency held a
sale); Hawaiian Gas Products, Ltd. v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1942) (condemnation proceedings held a sale). Many transactions involving intangibles
have been construed as resulting in capital gain or loss. See Citizens State
Bank v. Vidal, 114 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1940). "[A] lease [is] an asset ...
within definition of capital assets . . . in section 117." Sutliff v. Comm'r, 46
B.T.A. 446, 453 (1942).
7. Starr Bros., Inc. v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 149 (1952). See Rhodes v. Comm'r,
43 B.T.A. 780 (1941), aff'd sub nom. Rhodes' Estate v. Comm'r, 131 F.2d 50 (6th
Cir. 1942) (sale of right to receive dividends which have been declared held
ordinary income to vendor); Levy, The Line Between a Sale of Property and

the Anticipation of Ordinary Income, N.Y.U.

SEVENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON

399 (1949).
8. See, e.g., Parker v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1355 (1945); Williams v. Comm'r, 5
T.C. 639 (1945).
9. 313 U.S. 28, 61 Sup. Ct. 757, 85 L. Ed. 1168 (1941).
10. Cf. Oxford Paper Co. v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
But cf. Meredith v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 344 (1949).
11. 313 U.S. 28, 31, 61 Sup. Ct. 757, 85 L. Ed. 1168 (1941); followed as to income received from repossession of leased premises in Estate of Bryant v.
Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 1306 (1941).
12. Hort v. Comm'r, 313 U.S. 28, 31, 61 Sup. Ct. 757, 85 L. Ed. 1168 (1941).
See Jensen, Sale of Rights, Interest, and Other Intangibles, N.Y.U. EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 833 (1950).
13. But see Levy, supra note 7, at 399: "[I]t is basic that every capital gain
represents a conversion of prospective income to the extent that earning power
is a factor in the sales price."
FEDERAL TAXATION
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sition that dn interest or right, which if continued to be held by the taxpayer would produce ordinary income, should not be accorded capital
gains treatment if sold.14 The support given this position has been
meager. 15 Its frustration has been most obvious in those cases which
hold that the consideration received for transfer of a life estate in a
trust to the remainderman is capital gain. 16
The transaction in the Hort case is to be distinguished from the one
in the instant case. In the former, the lessor, in receiving the lump sum
payment, anticipated rent; in the instant case, the lessee, who received
the payment, did not anticipate rent, but parted with valuable property
rights and privileges which he alone possessed. This distinction, drawn
in the instant case, seems determinative.
If, in a transaction like the instant one, a sublease remains in effect,
the transfer is nevertheless a sale.'1 Similarly, if a lease is transferred
to a third party at a profit, the result is a capital gain.' 8 The description of the transaction in the instant case as a "cancellation" of a lease
(or as a release of the obligor-lessor from the contract by the obligeelessee) should not be permitted to obscure the true facts. 19 More was
involved than a termination of mere contractual rights and obliga14. "[The courts] have refused to regard as 'capital' transactions . . . divers

sorts of transfers of 'property,' especially those by which transferors have pro-

cured advance payments of future income." McAllister v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d
235. 239 (2d Cir. 1946)

(dissenting opinion). But cf. Smoak v. Comm'r, 43

B.T.A. 907 (1941) (proceeds from sale of exclusive sales agency held a capital
gain although clearly an essentially income item). See also Holtzman, Tax
Classics, 30 TAXES 65 (1952); Jensen, supra note 12, at 833.

15. "To apply.., the rule of the Hort decision would be the equivalent of
holding that when the owner of an interest in a rental property disposes of
such interest the consideration received therefor in excess of the cost basis is
essentially the equivalent of anticipated rentals therefrom." Sutliff v. Comm'r,
46 B.T.A. 446, 452 (1942). See Levy, supra note 7, at 402, indicating that the
Hort case has had but slight influence as precedent.
16. McAllister v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946); Bell's Estate v.
Comm'r, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943). See Reingold v. Comm'r, P-H 1941 BTA
MEm. DEC. f 41,319 (1941) (release by beneficiary's vendee of interest in future
interest payments on matured life insurance policy to beneficiary's conservators
given capital gains treatment): Rainier Brewing Co. v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 162
(1946), af'd, 165 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1948) (granting of exclusive right to trade
name a sale of a capital asset).
17. Sutliff v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942).
18. Ibid. An amount paid by a lessor to a lessee for the cancellation of an
unexpired lease is not an ordinary and necessary expense deductible in full
during the taxable year. Having been paid in order to obtain possession of the
premises for the unexpired term of the lease it is a capital expenditure to be
deducted over the period of the lease remaining before cancellation. The
amount paid represents the cost to the lessor of acquiring the right to the possession, use and enjoyment of his property for the remaining portion of the
lease. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 163 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.

1947); Borland v. Comm'r, 27 B.T.A. 538 (1933); Bretzfelder v. Comm'r, 21
B.T.A. 789 (1930).

19. See Sutliff v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942). See also Ray v. Comm'r, 18
T.C. 438 (1952) (lessee's release to lessor of a restrictive covenant in lease for
a consideration held a sale of a capital asset).
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tions.20 Petitioner had a property right in the premises fot the unexpired term. Transfer of this right to possession and use of the property
was properly denominated by the court as a sale of a capital asset,
within section 117, entitled to capital gains treatment. The Commissioner is obviously concerned that transfer of essentially income items
under the guise of capital assets may result in an artificial diminution
of ordinary income; this concern seems unwarranted in the instant
case.

INCOME TAXATION -TAXABLE
STOCK DIVIDEND
TREASURY STOCK HELD FOR INVESTMENT

-

Petitioners were two of the three principal stockholders of a corporation. The shares of stock owned by the third stockholder were
purchased by the corporation over a period of eleven years, paid for in
annual installments out of corporate earnings, and shown on the balance sheet of the corporation as an asset called "treasury stock." The
board of directors declared a dividend and distributed the stock pro
rata between the petitioners who treated the distribution as a nontaxable stock dividend. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency based
upon the fair value of the stock, as gross income. After paying, petitioners sought a refund. Held, for respondent Commissioner. Distribution of "treasury stock" acquired by purchase out of undivided profits
and held not for retirement, but for investment purposes, constitutes a
taxable dividend. Joseph P. Schmitt, P-H 1953 TC f 19, 114 (1953).
Although the federal income tax law has always included gain
from "dividends" within its definition of gross income,1 early decisions
excepted stock dividends on the theory that no income or gain is
realized by their mere receipt. 2 In 1916, express provision was made
for taxing stock dividends; 3 Eisner v. Macomber,4 however, held that a
dividend of common stock to the holders of the outstanding common
stock gave the recipients no income5 and could not constitutionally be
20. But cf. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v. District of Columbia, 85 App.
D.C. 301, 176 F.2d 952 (1949) (District of Columbia income ta:), which held
that cancellation of a lease is not a transfer but a termination and therefore not
a sale.
1. "'Gross income' includes gains, profits, and income derived from ...
interest, rent, dividends.., or the transaction of any business carried on for

gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." INT. REV. CODE § 22 (a).
2. E.g., Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 38 Sup. Ct. 158, 62 L. Ed. 372 (1918).
3. 39 STAT. 757 (1916).
4. 252 U.S. 189, 40 Sup. Ct. 189, 64 L. Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570 (1920).
5. "A 'stock dividend' shows that the company's accumulated profits have
been capitalized, instead of distributed to the stockholders or retained as surplus available for distribution in money or in kind should opportunity offer.
Far from being a realization of profits of the stockholder, it tends rather to
postpone such realization, in that the fund represented by the new stock has
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taxed.6 Attempts to interpret the decision in Eisner v. Macomber have
been responsible for much uncertainty in the taxation of corporate
distributions. 7 In the year following the decision the tax law was
amended to prohibit the taxation of all stock dividends.8 The view
that such dividends were not taxable was soon weakened, 9 however,
and in 1936, the law was changed to recognize that there can be some
stock dividends which give a recipient income taxable under the Constitution. 10 The test of taxability that has developed under this provision is that a stock dividend is not taxable unless after its receipt the
stockholder's proportionate interest is essentially different from his
former interest." Under this "proportional interest" test, it has been
fairly well established that a dividend payable in common stock to
holders of common is not income when there is no other stock outstanding.12 It has also been said that the fact that the dividend is paid
been transferred from surplus to capital, and no longer is available for actual
distribution." 252 U.S. 189 at 211.
6. "[N]either under the Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise has Congress
power to tax without apportionment a true stock dividend made lawfully and
in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind it, as income of the stockholder." Id. at 219.
7. E.g., Mertens found language in the opinion indicating the use of five
different tests as to realization of income: (1) whether there was any separation of assets from the corporation, (2) whether there was any change in the
stockholder's proportionate interest, (3) whether there was any change in the
value of the stockholder's holdings, (4) whether there was any effect on the
aggregate holdings of the other stockholders and (5) whether the new stock
represented anything different from what the stockholder had before. 1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 605-6 (1942).

8. "A stock dividend shall not be subject to tax ..... " Revenue Act of 1921

§ 201 (d), 42 STAT.227, 228 (1921).
9. Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 56 Sup. Ct. 767, 80 L. Ed. 1268 (1936)
(involving a question of basis after receipt of a stock dividend on old shares).
See the following decisions involving reorganization distributions: Cullinan v.
Walker, 262 U.S. 134, 43 Sup. Ct. 495, 67 L. Ed. 906 (1923); Rockefeller v. United
States, 257 U.S. 176, 42 Sup. Ct. 68, 66 L. Ed. 186 (1921); United States v.
Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 42 Sup. Ct. 63, 66 L. Ed. 180 (1921). Compare Marr v.
United States, 268 U.S. 536, 45 Sup. Ct. 575, 69 L. Ed. 1079 (1925), with Weiss v.
Starn, 265 U.S. 242, 44 Sup. Ct. 490, 68 L. Ed. 1001 (1924). All of these decisions
involved distributions under the Revenue Act of 1921, supra note 8, which were

not taxable as stock dividends.

its stock or
10. "A distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders in,
in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a dividend to the extent
that it does not constitute income to the stockholder within the meaning of
the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." INT. REV. CODE § 115 (f) (1).
At this same time § 201 (d) of the 1921 Act, supra note 8, was omitted.
11. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604, 63 Sup. Ct. 791, 87 L. Ed. 1029, 144
A.L.R. 1335 (1943); Strassburger v. Comm'r, 318 U.S. 604, 63 Sup. Ct. 791, 87
L. Ed. 1029 (1943); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 Sup. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed.
843 (1943). See Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47, 56 Sup. Ct. 767,
80 L. Ed. 1268 (1936). See also Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and
Stock Rights, 96 U. OF PA. L. REV. 147, 150-52 (1947); Rottschaefer, Present
Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in FederalLaw, 28 MINN. L. REv. 106 (1943).
12. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 Sup. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed. 843 (1943).
Cf. Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604, 63 Sup. Ct. 791, 87 L. Ed. 1029 (1943)
(dividend in nonvoting common on all outstanding voting, as well as nonvoting,
common); Strassburger v. Comm'r, 318 U.S. 604, 63 Sup. Ct. 791, 87 L. Ed. 1029
(1943) (dividend in new cumulative nonvoting preferred paid to sole owner
of only outstanding stock).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 6

in treasury stock does not affect the taxability of a distribution. 3
The decision in the instant case is not an abandonment of the present
limited application 14 of Eisner v. Macomber; the Tax Court has merely
held that the distribution was not a real stock dividend in the Eisner
sense. 15 The "dividend"'16 was found to be but a distribution of property held for investment purposes. 17 This result is analagous to that
reached where a taxable gain is recognized on the sale by a corporation of its own stock where the corporation deals in its own stock as it
would in the stock of another corporation. 18 The decision is, therefore,
an instance wher& taxation has been made to depend upon an analysis
of the substantive nature of the facts of the transaction, rather than
the application of any "common on common" formula based solely
upon the ultimate form of the distribution. 19

JUDGMENT

-

SUIT TO VACATE - INSUFFICIENT ALLEGATIONS
OF CRUELTY VOID DIVORCE DECREE

The plaintiff sued to set aside a divorce decree obtained by her
husband, on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction of both the
person and the subject matter. The lower court dismissed upon a finding that the wife had made a personal appearance in the former suit
and refused to hear evidence on the issue of jurisdiction of the subject
matter. Held, reversed and remanded. Since the husband had not al13. U.S. Treas. Reg..111, § 29.115-7 (1953), 1 P-H 1953 FED. TAX SERv. f1 9353
(1953). See Bruckheimer v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 234 (1942); Kay v. Comm'r, 28
B.T.A. 331 (1933), dismissed, 70 F.2d 1017 (4th Cir. 1934).

14. See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 398-404, 63 Sup. Ct. 636, 87 L. Ed.
843 (1943), clearly indicating that the constitutional holding in Eisner v. Macomber was no longer law and that it was possible for a stock dividend of
even common on common to be taxed by statute.
"Eisner v. Macomber dies a slow death. It now has a new reprieve granted
under circumstances which compel my dissent." Douglas, J., dissenting. 318
U.S. at 404.
15. "The language of the resolution viewed in the light of the facts revealed
by the record indicate that the distribution was the specific 1,486 shares of
stock acquired out of 'undivided profits' and not a stock dividend such as
would be nontaxable under the rationale of Eisner v. Macomber...

"

P-H

1953 TC ff 19,114 at p. 19,575 (1953).
"The distribution . . . effected no conversion of surplus into capital stock.
The balance sheet ...
shows that the ...
shares.., reacquired by purchase
out of earnings were carried as assets under the designation of 'Treasury
Stock.' Such stock was not acquired for retirement but for investment purposes." P-H 1953 TC ff 19,114 at p. 19,576 (1953).
16. Taxation here is based on the general definition of "dividend" in INT.
REV. CODE § 115(a): "The term . . .means any distribution made by a corporation to its shareholders, whether in money or in other property. . ....
(italics added).
17. P-H 1953 TC Ii 19,114 at p. 19,576 (1953).
18. Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 59 Sup. Ct. 423, 83
L. Ed. 536 (1939). See Rankin, Income Tax Aspects of a Corporation'sDealings
in Its Own Shares, 89 U. OF PA. L. REV. 934 (1941); Rankin, Taxability of Transaction by a Corporationin Its Own Stock, 47 YALE L.J. 111 (1937).
19. E.g., Chamberlin v. Comm'r, 18 T.C. 164, 174-75, 177 (1952).
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leged acts sufficientto constitute statutory cruelty, the court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter and the divorce decree was void
on its face. Bennett v. Bennett, 70 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1952).
Jurisdiction, often a very loosely used term,' is generally categorized
into two elements, (1) jurisdiction of the person and (2) jurisdiction
of the subject matter.2 The latter can be divided into two phases: (a)
jurisdiction over the general class of cases; (b) within that general
class, jurisdiction over the particular case based upon the existence of
3
certain jurisdictional facts.

Since the power of the court lies dormant until properly invoked by
the pleadings of one of the parties, 4 the court in any proceeding first
must look to the pleadings to see whether a case belonging to that
general class over which it has jurisdiction has been pleaded. The
sufficiency of the pleadings is not a jurisdictional question; therefore,
to give the court jurisdiction of the subject matter it is only necessary
that the pleader show he intended a cause of action within that general
class. 5 If the case pleaded is not within that general class over which
the court has jurisdiction, the court has no power to act and any action
it takes is void. 6
If the pleadings fall within the general class, the court at once has
jurisdiction to decide for itself the existence of other jurisdictional requirements.7 Such a decision is binding unless and until reversed on
1. "It has been well said that there is perhaps, no word or legal terminology
so frequently used as the word 'jurisdiction', so capable of use in a general
and vague sense, and which is used so often by men learned in the law without a due regard to precision in its application." Friend v. Northern Trust Co.,
314 Ill. App. 596, 42 N.E.2d 330, 334 (1942). See 14 Am. JuR. Courts §§ 159-60
(1938). In discussing the various definitions of the word jurisdiction, Van
Fleet says, "Jurisdiction is simply power." VAN FLEET, THE LAW OF COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS 70 (1892).

2. 14 AM. JuR. Courts § 160 (1938).
3. See Olson v. Hoffman, 4 F.2d 263, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1924); Lovett v. Lovett,
93 Fla. 611, 112 So. 768, 775 (1927); Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N.Y. 217, 229-30 (1878).
See also 1 BLACK, JUDGMENTS 171 (1891); 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT

619 (2d ed. 1945).
4. "The jurisdiction and power of a court remain at rest until called into
action by some suitor ... by pleading. . . ." Lovett v. Lovett, 93 Fla. 611, 112
So. 768, 775 (1927). See Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 381 (1936);
Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 608, 46 S.E. 603, 605 (1904).
5. See Foltz v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 60 Fed. 316, 318, (8th Cir. 1894); Greenwood v. Greenwood, 112 Cal. App. 691, 297 Pac. 589, 591 (1931); Friend v.
Northern Trust Co., 314 Ill. App. 596, 42 N.E.2d 330, 334-35 (1942); Main
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Columbia Super Cleaners, Inc., 332 Pa. 71, 2 A.2d
750, 751 (1938); Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437, 55 P.2d 377, 381 (1936); Jarrell
v. Laiirel Coal & Land Co., 75 W. Va. 752, 84 S.E. 933, 935 (1915). See also
14 AM. JUR., Courts 365 (1938); 21 C.J.S., Courts § 33 (1940); 1 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 365 (5th ed. 1925)..

6. See, e.g., Risley v. Phenix Bank of City of N.Y., 83 N.Y. 318, 337 (1881).
7. "If the court has jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the particular case belongs, it has jurisdiction to decide whether, so far as the particular case is concerned, the jurisdiction of the court attaches." Olson v. Hoffman,
4 F.2d 263, 264 (N.D. Ill. 1924). See also 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 718-19 (5th
ed. 1925).
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appeal or some other such review. 8" Where this matter is litigated, the
determination thereon is as conclusive as any other finding of fact.9
If the court's decision is wrong, the error is in the exercise rather than
in the assumption of its jurisdiction.10 If, however, the record shows
that a jurisdictional fact did not exist, the judgment is void on its face
and not entitled to enforcement." Where all jurisdictional facts are
pleaded or are recited by the court the majority rule is that the judgment is valid and no extrinsic evidence will be allowed to impeach
the record in a subsequent proceeding. 12 Where some jurisdictional
facts are omitted, a distinction is drawn between a court of general
jurisdiction and one of limited jurisdiction. 13 In a court of general jurisdiction there is a presumption that the court has jurisdiction, and
unless the record itself shows a lack of jurisdiction no extrinsic evidence will be allowed to overcome the presumption. 14 But if the court
is one of limited jurisdiction, then there is no presumption and extrin8. "If the circumstances which give rise to the jurisdiction do not exist in

a particular case the authority to act does not arise. But the question as to
whether or not they do in fact exist is a matter primarily for the court whose
powers are invoked, and it has jurisdiction to examine and determine whether
the particular application is within or beyond its authority. Its decision in this
respect is itself the exercise of a power conferred by the pleading or other
act invoking its jurisdiction, and if such decision is incorrect, whether because
of lack of evidence or for any other reason, it is none the less binding upon
the parties unless and until set aside on appeal or by some other proceeding

for that purpose." 1 FREEMAN,

JUDGMENTS

719 (5th ed. 1925). See also Gordon,

The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction,45 L.Q. REV. 459 (1929). But see Gavit,
Jurisdictionof the Subject Matter and Res Judicata, 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 386,
387 (1932).
9. Postal v. Postal, 192 Ind. 376, 134 N.E. 882 (1922); Bell v. Brown, 116
W. Va. 484, 182 S.E. 579 (1935). Cf. Kindrick v. Capps, 196 Ark. 1169, 121
S.W.2d 515, 517 (1938); Kuzak v. Anderson, 267 Ill. 609, 108 N.E. 662, 663
(1915) (finding of personal jurisdiction). See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 379
(5th ed. 1925).
10. Parker Bros. v. Fagan, 68 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1934); Friend v. Northern
Trust Co., 314 Ill. App. 596, 42 N.E.2d 330 (1942); Bowser v. Tobin, 215 Ind.
99, 18 N.E.2d 773 (1939); Honaker v. Honaker, 218 Ky. 212, 291 S.W. 42 (1927);
Ulrich v. Lincoln Realty Co., 175 Or. 296, 153 P.2d 255 (1944); Broduer v.
Broduer, 53 R.I. 450, 167 Atl. 104 (1933); Jarrell v. Laurel Coal & Land Co.,
75 W. Va. 752, 84 S.E. 933 (1915). See 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT 628
(2d ed. 1945); Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction,45 L.Q. REV. 459,
487 (1929).
11. E.g., Montgomery v. Suttles, 191 Ga. 781, 13 S.E.2d 781 (1941); Martin v.
Schillo, 389 Ill. 607, 60 N.E.2d 392 (1945).
12. Crouch v. H. L. Miller & Co., 169 Cal. 341, 146 Pac. 880 (1915) (recital of
jurisdiction of the person); McMurray v. Sivertsen, 28 Cal. App.2d 541, 83
P.2d 48 (1938); Postal v. Postal, 192 Ind. 376, 134 N.E. 882 (1922); Hopper v.
Hopper, 172 Md. 152, 190 Atl. 841 (1937). See 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 379
(5th ed. 1925). But see Broyhill v. Dawson, 168 Va. 321, 191 S.E. 779 (1937).
13. Some jurisdictions distinguish between courts of limited and general
jurisdiction; others, between inferior and superior courts; and still others, between courts of record and courts not of record. Freeman intimates the latter
distinction is the best. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS'§ 374 (5th ed. 1925).
14. See, e.g., Fisher v. Cowan, 205 Ark. 722, 170 S.W.2d 603, 606 (1943);
Dean v. Brown, 261 Ky. 593, 88 S.W.2d 298, 300 (1935); Mangani v. Hydro, Inc.,
119 N.J.L. 71, 194 Atl. 264, 265 (1937); In re Crouch's Estate, 191 Okla. 74, 126
P.2d 994, 996 (1942); Cooper v. Little, 29 Tenn. App. 685, 694, 201 S.W.2d 210,
214 (W.S. 1946).
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sic evidence will be allowed to show the nonexistence of any jurisdictional fact not appearing in the record.' 5
As the court in the instant case decided, the statutory grounds for
divorce are often jurisdictional facts. Although the husband alleged
cruel and inhuman treatment, which alone might be a conclusion of
law and therefore no allegation at all, he went further and alleged
the specific acts which he concluded amounted to cruel and inhuman
treatment. 16 Whether these acts did amount to cruel and inhuman
treatment was for that court to decide.' 7 If its decision was wrong the
error was only in the exercise and not in the assumption of jurisdiction.1 8 To allow a judgment to be set aside for error in the exercise
of jurisdiction would put an end to the finality of judgments as we
know it today. This decision should have been reviewable only on appeal and not in the proceeding here employed.
LABOR LAW - FILING REQUIREMENTS NONCOMPLIANCE AT TIME CHARGES FILED
At the time charges alleging unfair labor practices were filed, the
complainant union had failed to submit the non-Communist affidavits
required by section 9 (h) 1 of the Taft-Hartley Act. These requirements
were met, however, prior to the issuance of the complaint by the Board.
On petition for enforcement of the Board's order pursuant to the complaint the court of appeals set it aside and ruled that since compliance
had no retroactive effect, the Board was not empowered to entertain
the charge or issue a complaint or order based thereon. Held, reversed.
Section 9 (h) establishes a condition precedent only to the issuing of a
complaint; where a noncomplying union files charges and submits the
affidavits prior to issuance of the complaint, an order based thereon is
valid. NLRB v. Dant, 73 Sup. Ct. 375 (U.S. 1953).
15. Junkin v. Anderson, 12 Wash.2d 58, 123 P.2d 759 (1942).

Cf. Krivitsky

v. Nye, 155 Fla. 45, 19 So.2d 563, 568 (1944); Mangani v. Hydro, Inc., 119 N.J.L.
71, 194 Atl. 264, 265 (1937). But see Ross v. Pitcairn, 179 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1944).

16. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 126 W. Va. 498, 29 S.E.2d 1 (1944).
17. See note 7 supra.
18. See note 10 supra.
1. 61

STAT.

136 (1947), as amended, 65

STAT.

601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(h),

(Supp. 1952): "No investigation shall be made by the Board of any question
affecting commerce concerning the representation of employees, 'raised by a

labor organization ...

and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge-

[unfair labor practice] made by a labor organization... unless there is on file
with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the
officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an
affiliate or constituent unit that he . . . is not a member of or supports any
organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.... ." The
affidavit form (Form NLRB 1081) is found in 1 CCH LAB. LAW REP. (4th ed.)>
ff 1224 (1948).
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Under the Taft-Hartley Act the labor union has found itself faced
-with certain obligations. Among these are the so-called filing requirements - sections 9 (f),2 (g) 3 and (h) 4- which preclude the Board
from investigating petitions for representation or issuing unfair labor
practice complaints unless the labor organization files and maintains
with the government certain data including organizational statements,
financial reports, and non-Communist affidavits of its officers. 5 Numerous problems have arisen concerning these requirements. Aside from
the practical aspects of administration6 and effectiveness,7 the Board
and courts have had to decide whether the provisions are constitutional,8 whether compliance is litigable 9 and must be alleged and
proved, 10 whether federations as well as local and international unions
2. 61

STAT.

136 (1947), as amended, 65

STAT.

601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (f)

(Supp. 1952) (requires filing of constitution, by-laws, procedures and financial
statements with Secretary of Labor).
3. 61 STAT. 136 (1947), as amended, 65 STAT. 601 (1951), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(g)
(Supp. 1952) (maintaining annual reports with Secretary of Labor).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. The magnitude of the administrative work created by these requirements
is shown from an NLRB report: at the close of the fiscal year 1951, 225 national
and international unions were qualified; 15,678 local unions had complied;
139,483 officers of unions had filed the necessary affidavits; 9,999 local unions
with 92,455 officers had permitted their compliance to lapse. 16 NLRB ANN.
REP. 11-12 (1952).
6. A San Francisco lawyer objects that the huge task of collating the required material delays the Board's processes so that hearings may not take
place until six to nine months after the charge is filed. "As a result, during the
interval the enforcement of the act is frustrated and we go through a period
of nihilism in labor relations." Tobriner, The Taft-Hartley Act After Three
Years, 1 LABOR L.J. 1165, 1215 (1950). See also WOLLETT, LABOR RELATIONS AND
FEDERAL LAW 145 (1949).
7. All writers agree that Communist influence in the labor unions has decreased in the past few years; a disagreement arises as to whether Taft-Hartley
effected this decrease. See WOLLETT, LABOR RELATIONS AND FEDERAL LAW 36
(1949) ("considerable doubt"); Brown, Needed- A New Start on National
Labor Relations Law, 4 LABOR L.J. 71, 76 (1953) ("relatively ineffective");
Kearns, Non-Communist Affidavits under the Taft-Hartley Act, 37 GEo. L.J.
297, 304 (1949) ("one of the important factors"); Shair, How Effective is the
Non-Communist Affidavit? 1 LABOR L.J. 935, 943 (1950) ("a catalyst"); Comment, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 783, 790 (1951) ("not clear ... that the provision
has had a decisive effect"). An excellent discussion of the filing requirements
as a whole (wherein the conclusion is reached that the gains do not meet the
administrative and practical difficulties) is found in MILLIS AND BROWN, FROM
THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 541-60 (1950).
8. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 Sup. Ct. 674,
94 L. Ed. 925 (1950) (§ 9(h) constitutional); Nat. Maritime Union v. Herzog,
334 U.S. 854, 68 Sup. Ct. 1529, 92 L. Ed. 1776 (1948) (§§ 9 (f) and (g) constitutional), affirming to that extent, 78 F. Supp. 146 (1948).
9. See, e.g., In re The Coleman Co., 101 NLRB No. 51, 31 LAB. RSL. REP.
(Labor-Management) 1020 (1952) (an administrative determination); In re
Sunbeam Corp., 94 NLRB 844, 28 LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Management) 1115
(1951); cf. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 325, 71 Sup. Ct. 758,
95 L. Ed. 969 (1951). See also 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 47 (1952) ("the compliance
status of a labor organization is a matter exclusively for administrative determination by the Board .... ").
10. NLRB v. Michalik, 201 F.2d 48 (6th Cir. 1952) (need not be alleged or
proved); Law v. NLRB, 192 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1951) (not a prerequisite of
jurisdiction).
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must comply," whether the Board will investigate the truth or falsity
of the non-Communist affidavit 12 and whether the individual member
of the noncomplying union may file charges. 13
Although the requirements perhaps more stringently affect union
status in representation proceedings, 4 the problem of the instant case
arises out of the filing by a noncomplying union of a charge alleging
unfair labor practices. The question is presented whether the union
must have complied at the time charges were filed or only prior to the
issuance of the complaint.
Only one circuit

5

has agreed with the Board's position that com-

pliance must precede only the complaint. 6 The argument made was
that all the union's statutory rights remain and only a bar to remedy
is erected, which bar may be removed by compliance; "[t]he purpose
of Congress was not to make the Board's processes unavailable to em7
ployees, but to put a certain reasonable price upon their availability."'
Four other circuits, 18 however, reasoned that the Board could not entertain the charge since some advantage may accrue to the union
merely by reason of the fact that charges are entertained by the
Board, 9 and the elimination of Communism demands that the non11. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 71 Sup. Ct. 758, 95 L. Ed.
969 (1951) (the national federations, AFL and CIO, must comply before the
affiliated local can utilize Board processes). Prior to the Highland Park case it
was felt that compliance by national federations was not required. The Court
in the instant case may have been influenced by the fact that noncompliance
was based on this honest belief and was not mala fide. A different result might
have been reached had the complaint and order been based on a refusal-tobargain charge by a noncomplying Communist-dominated union.
12. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Herzog, 110
F. Supp. 220 (D.D.C. 1953) (Board not empowered to investigate truth of affidavits); see also 16 NLRB AxN. REP. 48 (1952) (Board will not attempt to
investigate truth or falsity of non-Communist affidavits).
13. NLRB v. Clausen, 188 F.2d 439 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 868
(1951) (filing requirements do not apply to individuals); NLRB v. Augusta
Chemical Co., 187 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1951) (acceptance of assistance from noncomplying union does not disqualify individual). But no individual can front
for a noncomplying union. NLRB v. Happ Bros. 196 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1952)
(Board order invalid where individual fronts for union); NLRB v. Alside, Inc.,
192 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1951); In re Wood Parts, Inc., 101 NLRB No. 93, 31 LAB.
REL. REP. (Labor-Management)

1090 (1952).

14. Brief statements of some of the problems faced in the field of representation as a result of noncompliance are found in Shair, supra note 7, at 938-39,
and in Comment, 18 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 783, 784-85 (1951).
15. See West Texas Utilities Co. v. NLRB, 184 F.2d 233, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
16. In re New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 604 (1950).
17. In re New Jersey Carpet Mills, Inc., 92 NLRB 604, 612 (1950).
18. NLRB v. Tennessee Egg Co., 199 F.2d 95 (6th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 201 F.2d
370 (1953); NLRB v. Nina Dye Works Co., 198 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1952), rev'd,
73 Sup. Ct. 390, 97 L. Ed. 328 (1953); NLRB v. American Thread Co., 198 F.2d
137 (5th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 73 Sup. Ct. 390, 97 L. Ed. 328 (U.S. 1953); NLRB v.
Dant, 195 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1952), rev'd, 73 Sup. Ct. 375 97 L. Ed. 311 (U.S.
1953).
19. Mr. John T. Casey, counsel for Dant, argued that 87.3% of all unfair labor
practice cases are disposed of at the charge and investigation stage, prior to the
issuance of a complaint by use of settlement agreement§ which incldue the
remedial provisions of a Board order. 31 LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Management)

122 (1952).
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complying union should find no favor whatsoever from the Act. In
resolving the conflict in favor of the Board's rule that compliance is a
condition precedent to the complaint only, the Supreme Court declared
that the purposes of the Act - to eliminate Communism and to regulate union activity -will be effected since no benefit can flow except
on the issuance of a complaint; further that since at any one moment
compliance is a matter of happenstance, to rule otherwise would deny
relief to the union which acts in good faith in periods of unintentional
lapse. When the union has complied with the filing requirements, the
Act's purposes are effectuated. Arguments as to which rule forces the
speedier compliance are largely speculative. Had the Court20 adopted
the opposite rule, its holding could not be found erroneous.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

-LIABILITY

FOR NEGLIGENCE

-

OPERATION OF SWIMMING POOL FOR PROFIT
Plaintiff's nine-year-old daughter drowned in a swimming pool
operated for profit by the defendant city. The plaintiff alleged that the
city was negligent in that the lifeguard, knowing of deceased's inability to swim, failed to remove the child from her peril though he
had the last clear chance to do so; that the lifeguards were inexperienced, untrained and inadequate in number; and that the pool was a
dangerous nuisance attractive to children. Defendant's demurrer was
sustained primarily on the ground' that operation of the pool was a
governmental, not a proprietary function and therefore the city was
immune from tort liability. Held, affirmed. Vaughan v. City of Alcoa,
251 S.W.2d 304 (Tenn. 1952). *
During the first part of the Nineteenth Century, the courts of the
United States generally imposed tort liability upon municipal cor-2
porations on the same theory as that applied to private corporations.
20. Senator Taft has introduced five bills to amend the Taft-Hartley Act.
LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Management) 209 (1953) for complete text.
Only one - Sen. No. 655 - deals with the filing requirements. Under that bill,
§ 9 (h) is changed to preclude the Board from entertaining a charge (thereby
would the rule of the instant case fall) unless the non-Communist affidavits are
filed; further the burden of filing such affidavits is placed on employers. Section 9 (f) is amended to eliminate the analysis of the by-laws from the requirements by striking § 9 (f) (6). For CIO analysis of Taft's proposals generally,
see 31 LAB. REL. REP. (Labor-Management) 257 (1953). The changes to filing
requirements are considered minor except for extension of the affidavit to employers, which many writers consider absurd. See Petro, The Taft Proposals
to Amend Taft-Hartley, 4 LABOR L.J. 227, 300 (1953).

See 31

1. Other grounds upon which the court sustained the demurrer were (1)
the allegations were not sufficient to charge a nuisance in the operation of the
pool, (2) the operation of a swimming pool was not an attractive nuisance.
Even where a governmental function is involved, the Court conceded that the
municipality would be liable if it "maintained a nuisance in the performance
of one of its governmental functions." 251 S.W.2d at 305 (Tenn. 1952).
2. Hooe v. Alexandria, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6666 (D.C. 1802); Steel v. Company
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The dictum in Bailey v. City of New York, 3 which set out a distinction
between a municipal corporation's liability for its negligent private
functions and its immunity from liability for its negligent public functions, was the first step toward the present-day dichotomy of muncipal
functions which has led to the confusion so prevalent in this field of
law. 4 Since developing and applying the "governmental-proprietary"
distinction in determining municipal immunity or liability, the courts
have been confronted with the exceedingly difficult problem of establishing a test 5 which would be a just compromise between the interests
of negligent municipalities and injured persons. The fear that judgments against cities for their negligence would stifle municipal development has prompted the courts to hold many municipal functions
to be governmental rather than proprietary in character. 6 One jurisdiction has held that all municipal functions are proprietary or private,7 whereas another has urged that municipal functions be conof Western Inland Lock Navigation, 2 Johns. 283 (N.Y. 1807); Barnett, The

Foundationsof the Distinctionbetween Public and Private Functionsin Respect
to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations, 16 ORE. L. REV.
250 (1937).
3. "If [powers to a city] granted for public purposes exclusively, they belong to the corporate body in its public, political or municipal character. But
if the grant [of power by the legislature] was for purposes of private advantage and emolument, though the public may derive a common benefit
therefrom, the corporation quoad hoc, is to be regarded as a private company.
It stands on the same footing as would any individual or body of persons upon
whom the like special franchises had been conferred." 3 Hill 531, 539, 38 Am.
Dec. 669, 672 (N.Y. 1842).
4. "The present state of things is one of confusion, fears, and assumptions,
and often injustice." Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of
Municipal Tort Liability, 9- LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 214, 233 (1942). "This
'bifurcation' of municipal corporations has of course .brought nothing but confusion and injustice from the beginning. Largely from humanitarian motives,
especially the later decisions in applying the distinction have tended, il-

logically, to reduce the scope of immunity and thus to make confusion worse

confounded; and an absurd and distressing mass of 'spotted and striped' law
is the result, not only considering the country as a whole but almost every
particular jurisdiction in it." Barnett, The Foundations of the Distinction between Public and Private Functions in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations,16 ORE. L. REV. 250, 269 (1937).
5. In Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253 Pac. 443 (1926), the court
held that the test of whether a city is acting in governmental or proprietary

capacity is whether the act is for the common good of the public without the

element of profit. "The liability or nonliability of a municipality for its torts
does not depend upon the nature of the tort, the relation existing between the
city and the person injured, or whether the city was engaged in the management of tangible property, but depends upon the capacity in which the city
was acting at the time." City of Kokomo v. Loy, 185 Ind. 18, 112 N.E. 994, 996
(1916). "The underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all
without the element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit. If it is,
there is no liability, if it is not, there may be liability." Bolster v. City of
Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (1917).
6. "There was a fear that an unrestrained demand to satisfy tort judgments
from public treasuries would stunt their [cities] growth. It was therefore
thought wiser to let the loss lie where it had fallen in certain instances than
to risk an obstruction in the development of this important unit of government and civilization." Repko, American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines
of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 214, 217 (1942).
7. In a tort action against a city which operated under the city manager
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sidered public or governmental unless there is a statute to the
contrary. 8
In applying the theory that since operation of a pool is a public service, the city, performing a governmental function, is not liable for its
negligence, the court in the instant case follows the reasoning of many
courts. Upon close analysis it would appear that all municipal functions in some measure perform a public service; consequently it could
be argued, with a devastating result upon the injured public, that a
municipality could never be held liable for any of its negligent acts.
The court is perhaps correct in stating that it is following the majority
view; 9 however, there is an abundance of authority among courts and
writers ° which would support a holding of liability.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in holding that a governmental
corporation could not be subject to garnishment, has previously indicated that the profit test would be employed to determine whether a
governmental or proprietary function was being performed." Yet the
same court failed to employ the profit test in the instant case where
the defendant city was clearly operating the pool as a "commercial and
economic adventurer." This court has granted the municipal corporation immunity from liability for negligence when its sometimes complan, the court said: "Therefore no municipal function is governmental, a city
is not a political subdivision of the state, not a government but purely a business, commercial, proprietary management of local public interests." Kaufman v. City of Tallahassee, 84 Fla. 634, 94 So. 697, 699 (1922).
8. See Irvine v. Town of Greenwood, 89 S.C. 511, 517, 72 S.E. 228, 230 (1911).
9. Accord, Crone v. City of El Cajon, 133 Cal. App. 624, 24 P.2d 846 (1933);
Mola v. Metropolitan Park District, 181 Wash. 177, 42 P.2d 435 (1935). "The
older, and probably still the majority, rule is that of non-liability, holding that
the maintenance of parks'is a governmental function looking to improvement
of public health." 34 McI. L. REv. 1250, 1251 (1936). For a general collection
of cases on swimming pools and bathing beaches, see Notes, 51 A.L.R. 370
(1927), 57 A.L.R. 402 (1928); on parks and playgrounds, see Notes, 29 A.L.R.
863 (1924), 42 A.L.R. 263 (1926).
10. Pickett v. City of Jacksonville, 155 Fla. 439, 20 So.2d 484 (1945); Glirbas
v. City of Sioux Falls, 64 S.D. 45, 264 N.W. 196 (1935); City of Belton v. Ellis,
254 S.W. 1023 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Burton v. Salt Lake City, 69 Utah 186, 253
Pac. 4,43 (1926); Hoggard v. City of Richmond, 172 Va. 145. 200 S.E. 610 (1939);
accord, Costello v. City of Aurora, 295 Ill. App. 510, 15 N.E.2d 38 (1938); see
Williams v. City of Longmont, 109 Colo. 567, 129 P.2d 110, 111 (1942); Baumgardner v. City of Boston, 304 Mass. 100, 23 N.E.2d 121, 125 (1939). "[I]n
view of the tendency of late decisions and the development of the law on this
subject, the rule will ultimately-prevail that in maintaining parks, playgrounds,
bathing pools and beaches, and like recreations, the city is performing a local
function for its people and it should be held liable on the same basis as a private person or corporation." 18 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONs 457 (3d
ed. 1950). 24 GEO. L.J. 1027 (1936); 34 MIcH. L. REV. 1250 (1936); 24 VA. L. RMv.
430 (1938); 44 W. VA. L.Q. 159 (1938).
11. "A distinction has been taken in cases against governmental agencies
wherein the state divested itself of its character of sovereign and descended to
the common level of a commercial and economic adventurer ....
[W]here the
sovereign divested itself of the attributes of government and descended to the
level of trafficker in private affairs under the guise of a public corporation, it
was held that the government could not abandon its assumed character and
seek immunity under the cloak of government." Home Owners' Loan Corp. v.
Hardie & Caudle, 171 Tenn. 43, 100 S.W.2d 238, 239 (1936).
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petitor, the private corporation, would be held for the same act. In its
denial for rehearing the court indicated that stare decisis Was the
controlling factor in its decision. 12 Consequently it may have missed
an opportunity to define what is a governmental and what is a proprietary function, and to adopt a view that would be in line with the
recent trend to impose liability upon municipalities for their negligent
operation of swimming pools and parks.' 3 To hold that a function is
governmental because it performs public service appears to state little
more than a conclusion and does not give any reliable reasons upon
which that conclusion is based. Thus it would appear to be advisable
for the legislature to provide a reliable standard for determining municipal tort liability.

PROCESS - CONSTRUCTIVE SERVICE TORT ACTION ARISING WITHOUT STATE
A New York statute provided for substituted service of process on
nonresident owners of aircraft for the purposes of litigation growing
out of accidents to aircraft "which landed at or departed from any airfield in this state."' Defendant was served with process pursuant to
this statute, and contested its application as a violation of due process,
since the cause of action arose out of a plane crash in California. The
plane had departed from a New York airport and had made five stops
en route. Held, the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with
the State of New York to subject it to the jurisdiction of the courts of
the state in a tort action, and the court could exercise this jurisdiction
although the cause of action arose without the state. Peters v. Robin
Airlines, Inc., 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 17, 1952).
In Hess v. Pawloski,2 the Supreme Court held constitutional a statute3 requiring nonresidents who used the highways of the state to ap12. Vaughan v. City of Alcoa, 251 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Tenn. 1952).

13. See note 10 supra.
1. "The operation by a nonresident of an aircraft from any airfield in this
state, or such operation of an aircraft owned by a nonresident if so operated
with his consent, express or implied, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the secretary of state to be his true and lawful
attorney upon whom may be served the summons in any action against him,
growing out of any accident or collision in which such nonresident be involved
while operating an aircraft which has landed at, or departed from any airfield
in this state...." N.Y. GEN. BusiNEss LAW § 250 (Cum. Supp. 1952).
2. 274 U.S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927). This case followed
Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 Sup. Ct. 30, 61 L. Ed. 222 (1916), which
held constitutional a New Jersey statute requiring nonresident motorists to expressly consent to the service of process on a designated public official.
3. For a collection of similar statutes, see Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp.
832 (N.D. Iowa 1947); Legis., 20 IowA L. REv. 654 (1935). See also cases collected in Note, 99 A.L.R. 130 (1935). For an analysis of the Hess v. Pawloski
doctrine ten years later, see Tapley, Jurisdiction and the Non-Resident Motorist, 13 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 278 (1939).
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4
point a designated state official as agent for the service of process.
The theory of the Pawloski holding was that placing such requirements
on nonresidents was a valid exercise of the state police power to protect the general welfare and safety of its residents in view of the dangerous character of the operation of motor vehicles.5 In Doherty & Co.
v. Goodman,6 the Court applied the same reasoning to the sale of securities within a state by a nonresident. Such activity was "fraught
with danger and economic harm to the general public."'7 In the Doherty case the fact that the activity engaged in was state regulated was
stressed, and subsequent cases have emphasized the same factor.8
The statute in the instant case appears to be substantially the same
as the nonresident motorist statutes interpreted in Hess v. Pawloski;
however, such statutes usually limit the jurisdiction of the courts to
causes of action arising out of accidents occurring within the state.9
The Supreme Court of the United States originally required that a
foreign corporation be "doing business"'10 within a state before it could
be subjected.to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state." This gave

4. Due process requires that the statute provide for notice reasonably calculated to reach the defendant. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct.
259, 72 L. Ed. 446 (1928); Horvath v. Brettschneider, 131 Misc. 618, 227 N.Y.
Supp. 109 (City Ct. 1928). But cf. Sorenson v. Stowers, 251 Wis. 398, 29 N.W.2d
512 (1947).
5. See note 2 supra. See also cases collected in Note, 99 A.L.R. 130 (1935);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 23 (1942).
6. 294 U.S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, 79 L. Ed. 1097 (1935). See Kaiser v. Butchart, 197 Minn. 28, 265 N.W. 826 (1936); 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 683 (1935).
7. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 203 (3d ed. 1949). See also Note, 99 A.L.R.
130 (1935).
8. See Sugg v. Hendrix, 142 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1944); Condon v. Snipes, 205
Miss. 306, 38 So.2d 752 (1949). Other cases have held the service valid regardless of whether the activity is state regulated. See, e.g., Interchemical Corp. v.
Mirabelli, 269 App. Div. 224, 54 N.Y.S.2d 522 (1st Dep't 1945); Wein v. Crockett,
113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222 (1948); 3 MIAMI L.Q. 623 (1949).
9. See note 3 supra.
10. For discussion of what constituted doing business, see People's Tobacco
Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed. 587 (1918);
Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COL. L. REV. 1018 (1925); Note, 36
HARV. L. REV. 327 (1923). There is some indication that doing business for the
purpose of jurisdiction may be different from doing business for the purpose
of securing a license to do business within a state.
11. After it was established that the foreign corporation was doing business
within the state it was held liable on one of three theories:
(1) By doing business the corporation "consented" to jurisdiction. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct.
344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed.
451 (U.S. 1856); 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAwS 385 (1935). For a review of the
statutes requiring the consent of the corporation to service of process before
it is allowed to do business, see Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from
Service of Process on Foreign Corporations,19 MINN. L. REv. 375 (1935).
(2) If the foreign corporation does business within the state, it is "present"
there for the service of process. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320,
47 Sup. Ct. 329, 73 L. Ed. 711 (1929); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
234 U.S. 579, 34 Sup. Ct. 944, 58 L. Ed. 1479 (1914); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 209 (3d ed. 1949); Haffer, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations as Defendants in the United States Supreme Court, 17 B.U.L. REv. 639
(1937).
(3) By doing business within the state the foreign corporation "submits"
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the state sufficient power over the defendant to, satisfy the require ments of due process. 12 However, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,3 the "doing business" test seems to have been cast aside and
a more liberal requirement established. In that case, the Court said
that the demands of due process "may be met by such contacts of the
corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the
context of our federal system of government, tc6 require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.' 4 The activities of the defendant within the state in that case were the soliciting
of orders and the exhibiting of samples by its agents. 15 In subsequent
cases, the soliciting by mail of insurance contracts 16 and the management of a foreign corporation by a president residing within the
state 7 have been sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction over the
nonresident corporation.
The Supreme Court held at an early date that a foreign corporation,
amenable to process because of a state statute, could not be sued on a
cause of action arising without the state.' 8 The cases so holding have
never been overruled, but later decisions, in reaching a contrary result,
have distinguished them on the basis that service there was on a pubto the jurisdiction of the state courts. This theory has not received express judicial sanction, but it has been mentioned in some of the cases. E.g., St. Louis
S.W. Ry. v. Alexander, 227 U.S. 218, 33 Sup. Ct. 245, 57 L. Ed. 486 (1913); People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 38 Sup. Ct. 233, 62 L. Ed.

587 (1918). See 1 BEALE,

CONFLICT OF LAWS

388 (1935).

12. Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 53 Sup. Ct. 529, 77
L. Ed. 1047 (1933); see Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U.S.
189, 193, 35 Sup. Ct. 579, 59 L. Ed. 910 (1915).
13. 326 U.S. 310, 66 Sup. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945), 21

N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 442 (1946).

14. 326 U.S. at 317.
15. The Court said: "It is evident that these operations establish sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just,
according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to
permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there."
326 U.S. at 320.
16. Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 70 Sup. Ct. 927, 94 L. Ed.
1154 (1950) (Virginia attempted to subject a Nebraska corporation to its "Blue
Sky Laws" -lack of jurisdiction in the Virginia courts asserted); cf. Boyd v.
Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 687, 49 So.2d 559 (1950). See cases collected
in Note, 94 L. Ed. 1167 (1949). See also 99 of U. OF PA. L. REV. 245 (1950).
17. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 Sup. Ct. 413, 96
L. Ed. 485 (1952). In this case defendant was a Philippine corporation driven
from its homeland by the Japanese occupation. The president resided in Ohio
and conducted directors meetings, transferred stock, carried on correspondence
and conducted corporate banking from his office there. See Note, 96 L. Ed.
495 (1952). Cf. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Lejeune, 189 F.2d 521 (5th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951), 12 LA. L. REv. 486 (1952) (issuance
of an insurance contract to a resident of Louisiana by a New York corporation
not sufficient to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in Louisiana). See generally Comment, ExpandingJurisdictionover ForeignCorporations,37 CORNELL

L.Q. 458 (1952); Note, Recent ConstitutionalDevelopments on Personal Juris-

diction of Courts, 4 VM-D.L. REV. 661 (1951).
18. Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236,
51 L. Ed. 345 (1907); Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115, 36 Sup. Ct., 255, 59
L. Ed. 492 (1915).
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lic official and not on the expressly appointed corporate agent.19 However, the Court recently held in Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co. 20 that a foreign corporation which was subject to the jurisdiction
of the courts of Ohio, under the InternationalShoe doctrine, could be
sued on a cause of action that arose outside of Ohio. The Court intimated that the question was not whether there was jurisdiction, but
whether the exercise bf jurisdiction was reasonable in view of the fact
that the cause of action arose outside of the state. The Court cast
some doubt on its previous decisions limiting jurisdiction to in-state
causes of action, intimating that, under the International Shoe doctrine, they were of doubtful efficacy. The state courts have consistently
allowed the action in this type of case. 21 The court in the instant case
finds the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable, relying strongly on the
decision of a lower federal court which held the venue proper in a
New York federal court where the cause of action arose in California.2 2
Although the statute in the instant case is similar to that in Hess v.
Pawloski, the holding seemingly is based on the International Shoe
doctrine presumably on the theory that the landing and taking off of
aircraft from an airport within the state is sufficient contact with the
jurisdiction to make the airline amenable to constructive process. 23
The result reached seems to extend the Hess v. Pawloski type of statute
to actions arising outside of the forum state by interpreting the statute
in light of the InternationalShoe doctrine. If the statute in the instant
case is based upon the state police power, the Supreme Court of the
United States could easily reject the reasoning of the New York court
as an attempt to give extraterritorial effect to the police power of that
state.
19. See Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243
U.S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344, 61 L. Ed. 610 (1917); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 72 Sup. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952); Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
20. 342 U.S. 437, 72 Sup. Ct. 413, 96 L. Ed. 485 (1952).

21. See Enger v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., 176 Minn. 143, 222 N.W. 901
(1929); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 112 S.W.2d
865 (1938); Karius v. All States Freight, Inc., 176 Misc. 155, 26 N.Y.S.2d 738
(Sup. Ct. 1941); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Geiitry, 191 Okla. 659, 132
P.2d 326 (1942); Thompson v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 38 S.D. 570, 162 N.W. 373

(1917); Patton v. Continental Casualty Co., 119 Tenn. 364, 104 S.W. 305 (1907).
For decisions contra,see cases collected Note, 145 A.L.R. 630 (1943).
22. Kibler v. Transcontinental &Western Air, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 724 (E.D.N.Y.
1945).
23. Instant case, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2293. Due to the brevity of the Law Week
report it is possible that other contacts were present in the case which are not
mentioned, but which might lend greater weight to the court's decision.
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TORTS

-

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

-

APPLICATION TO

DISAPPEARING AIRPLANE
Plaintiffs, as personal representatives, sought damages for the death
of their decedents who were passengers on defendant's airplane, acommercial carrier, which disappeared without a trace while on a
flight. There were no icing or storm conditions prevailing along the
route at the time of the disappearance. The federal court, applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, allowed recovery. Held, affirmed. The
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in an action for wrongful death following the disappearance of a commercial airliner. Bachman v. Des
Marais, 100 F. Supp. 1, affd mem., 198 F.2d 550 (1952).
The common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is generally said to
have three necessary elements. First, there must be an accident which
is of such a nature that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of
someone's negligence; second, it must have been caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
third, the accident must not have been due to the voluntary action of
the injured party.' Most cases state that the policy underlying the doctrine is that evidence of the true cause of the accident is more readily
2
accessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff.
There is a sharp conflict as to the application of res ipsa loquitur in
actions involving airplane crashes. Some courts, taking the view that
there are too many possible causes of crashes other than negligence, refuse to apply the doctrine. 3 Others utilize the doctrine4 on the basis
1. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 689, 162 A.L.R. 1258,
1261 (1944); PROSSER, TORTS 295 (1941); 9 WIGMORE. EVIDENCE

§ 2509 (3d ed.

1940).
2. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 154 P.2d 687, 689, 162 A.L.R. 1258,
1261 (1944); Connor v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 189 Cal. 1, 207 Pac. 378, 379, 22

A.L.R. 1462, 1465 (1922); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hodgson, 91 Colo. 365, 14 P.2d 1081,
1084, 83 A.L.R. 1156, 1161 (1932). See 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509 (3d ed.
1940), 38 Am. JuR., Negligence § 299 (1941). But Prosser doubts that this is the
true basis of the rule. See PROSSER, TORTS 301 (1941).
3. Cohn v. United Airlines, Inc., 1948 U.S. Av. Rep. 623 (U.S.D.C., D. Md.
1948); Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 81 S.W.2d 849 (1935); Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212, 83 A.L.R. 329 (1932);
Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469
(Co. Ct. 1933). See Boulineaux v. Knoxville, 20 Tenn. App. 404, 410, 99 S.W.2d
557, 560 (E.S. 1935), where the court, in holding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
inapplicable to an airplane crash, said: "This is not a case for the application
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitpr, for it is a common and not an unusual occurrence for airplanes to stall and fall while in operation, and without the intervention of any act upon the part of the operator." The trial judge in the
Wilson case stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applied to unexplained airplane crashes "discards as too improbable for consideration the
chance that the ignition may have unexpectedly failed through the breaking
under vibration of the copper strands concealed by insulation, that the generator or magneto may have failed internally, or the porcelain insulation on a
spark plug may have broken from the heat, that a particle of sediment or drop
of water may have reached the carburetor needle at a critical moment, that
the gasoline feed line may have broken under the vibration or become clogged,
these and many other things which are consistent with care must be rejected
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that it is particularly suitable in actions against common carriers because of the high degree of care required of them.5 When the doctrine
is applied, the element most frequently emphasized by the courts is
control over the instrumentality. 6 Thus where a private plane has dual
controls and it cannot be determined whether the pilot or passenger
7
had control at the time of the crash, the doctrine is inapplicable.
In the instant case, the court reasoned that the airplane was unlikely
to disappear in the absence of negligence of the defendant. Without
discussing the other elements, it further found exclusive control of the
airplane in the defendant notwithstanding CAB limitations on air carriers. The attempt of the defendant to avoid application of the doctrine
on the ground that the knowledge of both the plaintiff and defendant
of the facts was equal was rejected by the court which reasoned that
"equal ignorance" - where neither party knows the causal factors of
the accident- will not preclude the use of res ipsa loquitur.8
The court relied on three crash cases involving airlines as authority
for applying the doctrine. 9 This is apparently the first case involving
disappearing aircraft. All of the elements of res ipsa loquitur are present, and if one can accept the reasoning that the defendant is better
able to explain the accident than the plaintiff, the holding is within
the policy upon which the doctrine is said to be based. Further it reaffirms the position of other courts requiring a high degree of care

if the res ipsa rule is to operate." Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 1931

U.S. Av. Rep. 109, 110 (Mun. Ct. of Boston 1931), aff'd, 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E.
212, 83 A.L.R. 329 (1932).
4. See Bratt v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 169 F.2d 214, 215 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 886 (1948) (common carrier); Smith v. Pacific Alaska Airways,
Inc., 89 F.2d 253, 254 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 700 (1937) (common carrier); Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940, 942-45, 6
A.L.R.2d 521 (D.C. 1948) (common carrier); Smith v. O'Donnell, 5 P.2d 690,
693 (Cal. App. 1931), aff'd and op. adopted, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932)
(common carrier) (res ipsa loquitur applied but defendant successfully rebutted the presumption); Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 231 App. Div.
867, 247 N.Y. Supp. 251, 253 (2d Dep't 1930) (private carrier); Stoll v. Curtiss
Flying Service, 1930 U.S. Av. Rep. 148, 152, 153 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930) (private
carrier). See Note, 4 VAND.L. REv. 857 (1951).
5. See Smith v. Pennsylvania Central Airlines Corp., 76 F. Supp. 940, 945,
6 A.L.R.2d 521 (D.C. 1948); Smith v. O'Donnell, 5 P.2d 690, 692 (Cal. App.
1931), aff'd and op. adopted, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932). Prosser expresses
some disapproval of such a view; see PROSSER, TORTS 299 (1941).
6. See Wilson v. Colonial Air Pransport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 180 N.E. 212,
214, 83 A.L.R. 329 (1932); State v. Henson Flying Service, 191 Md. 240, 60 A.2d
675, 678, 4 A.L.R.2d 1300 (1948).
7. Parker v. James E. Granger, Inc., 4 Cal.2d 668, 52 P.2d 226 (1935), appeal
dismissed, 298 U.S. 644 (1936); Budgett v. Soo Sky Ways, Inc., 64 S.D. 243, 266
N.W. 253 (1936); Towle v. Phillips, 180 Tenn. 121, 172 S.W.2d 806 (1943).
8. 100 F. Supp. 1, 2 (1951).
9. Pacific Alaska Airways v. Mahan, 89 F.2d 255 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 700 (1937); Smith v. Pacific Alaska Airways, 89 F.2d 253 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 700 (1937); Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, 231 App. Div.
867, 247 N.Y. Supp. 251 (2d Dep't 1930).
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from commercial air-carriers'0 and placing the burden on the carrier to
exonerate itself or pay." In view of the cases applying the doctrine to
crashes, the use of res ipsa loquitur here does not seem unwarranted.
10. See Smith v. O'Donnell, 5 P.2d 690, 692 (Cal. App. 1931), aff'd and op.

adopted, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932); Kamienski v. Bluebird Air Service,
Inc., 321 Ill. App. 340, 53 N.E.2d 131, 134 (1944), aff'd, 389 Ill"462, 59 N.E.2d 853

(1945).

11. See PROSSER, TORTS 299 (1941).

